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Abstract
Trust is defined as a belief of a human H (‘the trustor’) about the ability of
an agent A (the ‘trustee’) to perform future action(s). We adopt here dispo-
sitionalism and internalism about trust: H trusts A iff A has some internal
dispositions as competences. The dispositional competences of A are high-level
metacognitive requirements, in the line of a naturalized virtue epistemology.
(Sosa, Carter) We advance a Bayesian model of two (i) confidence in the deci-
sion and (ii) model uncertainty. To trust A, H demands A to be self-assertive
about confidence and able to self-correct its own models. In the Bayesian ap-
proach trust can be applied not only to humans, but to artificial agents (e.g.
Machine Learning algorithms). We explain the advantage the metacognitive
trust when compared to mainstream approaches and how it relates to virtue
epistemology. The metacognitive ethics of trust is swiftly discussed.
Synopsis
We argue for the importance of metacognitive requirements on trust. Trust is
a two- or three-place predicate and it implies that H, i.e. the human trustor,
expects that an agent A (the ‘trustee’) ‘will take care of the things’. (Baier
1986; Jones 1996; Carter 2019) H has a belief or a positive disposition to think
that A is going to perform a set of actions in the future, on which H depends
to some extent.
When is H ’s trust in A rational? How much does H need to know about A in
order to entrust it? As trust always incurs uncertainty and a non-negligible level
of risk and uncertainty, a more formal analysis based on Bayesian epistemology
is more adequate.
A deflationary view about trust is to claim that trust is just a form of re-
liance. We trust (or distrust) friends, relatives, experts, some communities, some
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institutions, scientific communities, and some domesticated animals, but we rely
only on some artifacts or natural entities. Trust and reliance have a common
ground: we trust humans to behave predictably, in a sense that regular behavior
applies to other agents. (Hollis 1998) The case of predictability of the behavior
of artifacts is enticing philosophically. Artifacts, including artificial agents, sit
between natural agents and human agents. One way to differentiate trust and
reliance is to admit that agent A needs to have some epistemic and moral com-
petences. We take this difference further: we advance a metacognitive argument
for trust: A needs to display a multi-level type of knowledge, which suggests a
virtue epistemology approach (Sosa, Greco, Carter) The present paper adopts
a naturalized virtue epistemology by integrating traditional epistemology into
the theoretical framework proposed recently in cognitive science (Fleming, Daw,
Proust, Meyniel, Timmermans, etc.).
We argue that rationality of trust entails a more throughout analysis of
H ’s and A’s competences and that a metacognitive approach to trust adds
significant mileage to the existing arguments on the rationality of trust. Trust
of H in A (human or artificial) implies a process of rational deliberation about
the competencies of A. The cognitive agent A, be it artificial or not, has a set
of goals, makes some choices, and is able to calculate costs and gains of its own
action. A set of metacognitive requirements can be added to the cognitive agent
A: confidence level, ability to detect its own errors in modeling the world, or
more elevated metacognitive competencies such as: self-reflection, humility of
judgments, ability to suspend judgment, or consciousness.
Further, we claim that the requirement of A being rational can be couched
in terms of probabilities, conditionalizations, and computational processes. Let
us assume that a rational agent A is more trustful than a less rational agent
A’. In the metacognitive framework, we think that A’ can be characterized as
having fewer (or none) metacognitive competencies in comparison with A. In
the line of the naturalized approach preferred here, we can relate rationality to
some metacognitive processes that A is able to instantiate. The best framework
to synthetize these ideas is the Bayesian epistemology. We start with a sim-
ple model in which the world has two states only and A perceives the it with a
given amount of noise and distortion and makes a decision about the state of the
world. After discussing briefly the concepts of ‘accuracy’ and ‘confidence’, we
propose a cognitive model of trust based exclusively on accuracy and a metacog-
nitive, two-level, model based on confidence. Confidence is taken here as an in-
dependent computational process happening in human agents (Fleming&Daw,
Timmermans, Meyniel) or in some artificial agents. In the confidence definition
of trust, we assume that the probability of accuracy of A’s judgment increases
conditionalized upon the calculation of A’s confidence (when confidence of A is
offered to H as an independent parameter of the decision-making process, sim-
ilar to a statistical result). Some authors think that confidence can be a simple
statistic summary of the judgment or can be a property of the populations of
neurons used in the judgement (Timmermans). We conclude the paper by dis-
cussing the case of artificial agents based on machine learning in which different
procedures to avoid overfitting can instantiate some of the metacognitive re-
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quirements: suppressing of data noise, and model uncertainty (Gal, Mackay).
A brief digression in ethics about metacognitive requirements on trust concludes
our paper.
1 Introduction: Trust matters
When is it rational, or irrational, to cooperate, or to not cooperate, with other
agents? How much do we need to know about other agents in order to be ready
to cooperate with them? Is it morally right (or morally wrong) to cooperate
with this particular agent? Moreover: how will cooperation look like in the
future societies?
Most answers to these questions involve in a form or other concepts such
as ‘reliance’ and ‘trust,’ which have played historically a constitutive social
and political role in human societies. (Gambetta, 1988; Cook, 2003; Hosking,
2014) Nevertheless, in the current political and social climate, we are more and
more concerned about the erosion of trust in institutions, experts, democracy,
religion, education, etc. We are currently witnessing the downfall of trust in
science and in technology. A future society with isolated individuals losing
trust in their peers, reclused to computer games, virtual reality or social media
is equally the future of a society with little trust or no trust.
Is the social cooperation in the communities of the future going to be based
on trust, as it used to be during the progress of humankind? Or, on the contrary,
will we witness a trustless society dominated by individuals unable to build trust
and to rely on their fellow citizens?
Trust in an informal way implies that H (a human trustor) hopes or expects
that A (an agent, the trustee) “will take care of the things” as H entrusted A.
(Baier, 1986; Jones, 1996; Carter, 2019) This is called by some the doxastic view
of trust, in which H has a belief that A is going to perform a set of actions in
the future. As trust always incurs uncertainty and a non-negligible level of risk,
it can explain why cooperation is always risky.
Like trust, reliance is a cognitive attitude towards artifacts, bodies of knowl-
edge (scientific theories, religious doctrines, traditions, ideologies, etc.), institu-
tions, communities, etc.1
The mainstream philosophical literature views trust as ‘more’ than reliance,
and some requirements can be imposed on the trustee A: personhood, trust-
1Some people claim that we rely (or not) on bridges, cars, buildings, technologies, scientific
theories, institutions, legislations, religions, etc. but we do not ‘trust’ or ‘cooperate’ with it.
We trust (or distrust) friends, relatives, experts, some communities, some institutions, scien-
tific communities, and some domesticated animals. We cooperate with these agents and not
merely rely on them. Trust and reliance have a common ground: we trust humans to behave
predictably, in a sense that regular behavior applies to other agents: some animals, some
phenomena governed by natural laws, etc. (Hollis, 1998) The case of predictability of artifacts
is enticing philosophically. Artifacts, including artificial agents, sit between natural agents
and human agents. Does a team of surgeons ‘cooperate,’ ‘trust,’ or ‘cooperate’ with a robot
surgeon? Do doctors trust the robot surgeon or merely rely on it? What do we mean when we
say that the robot surgeon ‘complements,’ rather than ‘replace,’ the human surgeons? Similar
questions can be raised about unmanned vehicles, lethal weapons or diagnostic systems.
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worthiness, moral responsibility, goodwill etc. This leaves us with a restrictive
concept of trust: in this view A is endowed with human agency, hence the
interpersonal nature of trust.
1.a Main aim of this paper
We do not endorse the idea that trust is only inter-personal—we prefer a more
general concept of trust to include non-individual or non-human agents A. This
paper focuses on the epistemology of trust: its rationality, its metacognitive
aspects, and the way it can be generalized to other types of agency, especially
artificial agency. Our main aim is to argue for some common ground between
the way we could entrust artificial agents and the way we entrust human agents.
The best theoretical framework to bridge trust in artificial agency with existing
approaches to interpersonal trust is a naturalized version of virtue epistemology
that employs probabilism, conditionalization, and tools from Bayesian episte-
mology.
We are interested in requirements imposed on A such that we build the ‘right’
trust in reliable technologies of the future and a precautionary stance towards
those technologies which are dangerous. How do we build trust in AI (artificial
intelligence) technologies and other algorithms (especially Machine Learning)
as ‘autonomous artificial agents’ (hereby, AAA). We argue that trust needs a
metacognitive component and that Bayesian epistemology can be successfully
used in this respect.
1.b Philosophy and trust
There is a rich literature on trust in social science, psychology, and philosophy.
Philosophers look for a genuine concept of trust to contrast it with folk concepts
of trust, so much of the philosophical analyses are based on some restrictions
on trust, with a normative load. (Nickel, 2017)
Most restrictive definitions of trust follow a template like this: “To trust A
means to rely on A and to believe that A has X ”. The requirement X is some
superior cognitive or moral capacity. It can be interpreted as a disposition, as a
competence, or a high-level skill. It is a good idea to interpret trust as a set of
constraints imposed on a weaker concept such as reliance or some na¨ıve forms
of trust. We suggested that philosophers prefer to talk about inter-personal
trust, when A is not ‘something’, but ‘somebody.’ A must be a person with
her agency, desire, goodwill, moral compass, moral responsibility, high level
knowledge, social profile, etc. Jones (Jones, 1996) 14 writes: “One can only
trust things that have wills, [. . . ] although having a will is to be given a generous
interpretation so as to include, for example, firms and government bodies.”2
2Hawley explains that one can trust somebody to look for a vase, but one only relies on a
shelf to hold the vase. (Hawley, 2014) If I break the vase, its owner, who entrusted me, can be
disappointed in me, betrayed by me, or demand an apology from me, although the owner will
not feel the same about a shelf that was supposed to support the vase, although the owner
may have some similar feeling towards the designer, or the manufacturer, or the assembler of
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2 Virtues, knowledge, metacognition, and trust
One way to advance a metacognitive argument for trust is to define it in a
multi-level epistemology, and then naturalize it. Our choice is here for virtue
epistemology, which is considered by some a non-standard, non-traditional, epis-
temology. We then argue for a naturalized version of it in the metacognitive
framework.
2.a Levels of knowledge and epistemic virtues
In virtue epistemology, knowledge is a form of competence or achievement.
(Sosa, 2007, 2018) A competence is the disposition to perform well in a given
domain. E. Sosa postulates two levels (or ‘grades’) of knowledge: at the lower
level (called ‘animal knowledge’) the knower does not have an epistemic per-
spective on her belief, but she exercises a reliable competence to believe. In
Sosa’s view this level requires apt belief, a belief that is “correct attributably to
a competence exercised in appropriate conditions” (Sosa, 2007, 2018) 93 In this
view, competence accounts for why knowledge is superior to a mere true belief.
Aptness does not require a reflection on one’s own.
To have high-level knowledge (‘reflective knowledge’), the knower needs a
perspective from which she endorses the source of that belief. Some virtue
epistemologists talk about two levels of epistemic virtues. (Baehr, 2006; Lep-
ock, 2014; Fairweather, 2014) We have some knowledge-generating processes
that produce new information from perception, memory, or deduction. Then
there is a higher-level type of epistemic virtues such as consciousness, humil-
ity, self-control, goodwill, originality, creativity. Baehr calls the latter ‘good
intellectual character traits.’ (Baehr, 2006) There is a virtue epistemology pri-
marily concerned with the first type of virtue (virtue reliabilists), while virtue
responsibilists focus on the high level type. (Greco, 2000)
In the line of this virtue epistemology, Carter recently has analyzed trust as
a bi-level concept and provided different definitions of trust. (Carter, 2019) He
defines a type of trust called ‘fully-apt trust’. First, there are some cognitive
and externalist requirements on A. H hopes A will take care of things, and
that A can successfully fulfill the actions when A is in a ‘proper shape and
properly situated.’ But this are not the only conditions on A: H fully apt trust
A when H’s trust is ‘convictive’: “it is aptness on the first order guided by apt
awareness on the second order that the first order performance would be apt
(likely enough).” (Carter, 2019) 22 This third condition is metacognitive and
improves the quality of H ’s trust in A when A is able to reflect through as a
second order process upon its own error in thinking and upon its own confidence
in reasoning.
We intend to adopt a naturalized virtue epistemology which is shaped by
empirical evidence and to give a formal expression of this second-order monitor-
ing competence suggested by responsibilists: the immediate option is to think
in terms of metacognitive requirements.
the shelf.
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2.b Metacognition and agency
Humans are often aware of errors in making decision and are able to report levels
of confidence. The subject is often aware of the difficulty of making a decision.
Cognitive science literature shows that these confidence levels are sometimes
correlated with objective performance. Behavior is guided by these assessments
of decision quality especially when there is no independent feedback available.
In the case of AAA agents, when feedback or reward are not available, one can
intuit the importance of self-assessment of performance.
The study of the disposition to reflect upon our own performance in mem-
ory, perception, learning, reasoning, communicating, and, ultimately, upon our
own limit of knowledge, is an area of cognitive science called ‘metacognition.’
(Nelson, 1996; Proust, 2007; Fleming and Frith, 2014) As the processes of self-
reflection, monitoring and controlling cognition, it is a superior one of the most
sophisticated cognitive dispositions of mature humans and possibly a uniquely
human cognitive disposition (psychologists still debate whether animals or in-
fants have it).
In the heyday of the booming literature on metacognition, Nelson proposed
some principles of metacognition. He suggested that in humans and animals,
mental processes are divided into a low-level (object-level) and a high-level
(meta-level). (Nelson, 1990) The high-level is always a model of the low-level
and the two levels are related by causal relations such as: monitoring, con-
trolling, and correcting. The control flow entails that the high-level causally
influences the low-level by initiating, sustaining, or terminating activity.
As experimental philosophy and cognitive science have it, the ability to assess
its own actions and knowledge is a superior competence. Together with Carter,
we can use this definition in our approach to trust. But we need to see whether
the agents can run an independent process of assessing their confidence, and
this metacognitive requirement can be linked directly to the rationality of both
A and H.
3 Rationality of trust and a plea for a Bayesian
approach
3.a Rationality of trust
As a complex construct, trust involves the nature of both H and A, as well as A’s
future actions. As expected, a philosophical analysis of trust can be embedded
in both epistemology and ethics. But for the sake of the present argument, we
focus on its epistemology and just marginally on its ethics. The literature on
trust refers frequently to its rationality: when do we have enough warrants to
trust somebody (or something)?
Trust of H in A is rational when there are enough reasons to believe that A
acts rationally in some substantial way. We advance here a thesis about trust:
the requirement of A being rational can be couched in terms of probabilities, con-
6
ditionalizations, and computational processes. It is clear that a rational agent
A is more trustful than a less rational agent A’. In the line of the naturalized
approach preferred here, we relate rationality of trust to some metacognitive
processes that A is able to instantiate. Trust and its relation to rationality have
interesting epistemic implications. (Gauthier, 1987; Hieronymi, 2008; Faulkner,
2014; Rosenkranz, 2015) Our claim is that rationality of trust needs to include
metacognitive components. This condition is, we argue, suitable to a case in
which A is a human agent and when A is a technology, and especially an AI
algorithm. Restrictive approaches to trust insist that ‘genuine trust’ has solid
epistemological and ethical components. A mere description of what trust was
historically or factually is not enough to ground trust in new technologies: we
have not faced the challenges of AI, or synthetic life, or artificial life before.
What means to be trustful when it comes to non-human agents?
We side here with a cognitive or rational approach to trust, in which trust is
the product of a rational process. Trust in artificial agents implies a process of
rational choice occurring in H and in A. The agent, be it artificial or not, has a
set of goals, makes some choices and is able to calculate costs and gains of its own
action. We argue that relating trust to cognitive and metacognitive abilities of
the artificial agent has advantages over some non-cognitive approaches to trust.
3.b Confidence and trust
Here is again one requirement discussed by Carter: H can trust A if A is success-
fully reliable enough, only when A is in a proper shape and properly situated.
To improve the quality of trust, Carter suggests adding a ‘convictive’ require-
ment on trust: H is guided in her trust in A by A’s second-order assessment of
risk in making a decision.
We relate ‘risk assessment’ from virtue epistemology to operationalizable
quantities as measured in experimental philosophy or cognitive science. We
think that confidence level as expressed in cognitive science literature is a good
starting point for a metacognitive approach to trust. As a second order process
in the brain, confidence is a belief about the validity of our thoughts, actions
and performance. (Timmermans Bert et al., 2012; Meyniel et al., 2015; Fleming
and Daw, 2017). Confidence is strongly related to awareness and consciousness
and can be formalized in various ways. In neuroscience, Bayesian approaches to
confidence are grounded in the assumption that uncertainty is coded in natural
neural networks. We can extend this assumption to artificial neural networks
and hence to artificial agents based on machine learning algorithms (see next
section).
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4 A probabilistic approach to trust
4.a Bayesian trust: accuracy vs. confidence
How do we relate trust to metacognition? We contrast here mere accuracy of
representation as low level knowledge with confidence in one’s representation as
a high-level type of knowledge. As Karmiloff-Smith put it: the knowledge in the
system is not the same as knowledge for the system.(Clark and Karmiloff-Smith,
1993)
At the beginning, without any evidence, the trustor H can have a certain
degree of belief that agent A will represent the world as accurate as possible.
But as Bayesian epistemology goes, this is only a prior probability that will be
updated based on the actions of A. In the line of our previous discussion on
metacognition, let us suppose that A is able to update its own confidence level
in a similar, Bayesian way.
Let us imagine now a simplified agent A that is designed to produce an ac-
curate observation of a current state of the world. The agent builds a model of
its environment and makes a decision about acting upon this environment. The
world (the world is here the totally of the variables of the environment in which
A perceives and acts) is in a state w∈W . To simplify, we can imagine that the
world has only two possible states W = (W1, W2) (in experiments discussed in
cognitive science, W is just an object that is oriented in two directions: ‘1=left’
or ‘2=right’). By convenience we can think of W 1 as represented by value ‘-1’
and W 2 as represented by value ‘1.’
3 The stimulus that A receives is noisy
and inaccurate. The agent makes one observation o, which is not identical to
w, but it is roughly correlated with w, given some noise factor and distortion
of perception. Unlike w which is discrete, o takes any value on a continuous
spectrum, which can be normalized to the interval o∈O = [−1; 1]. This obser-
vation creates a change in the internal decision variable X act which can follow
a Gaussian distribution conditional on the world w and on observation o:
Xact∼N(w, σ2act)
In this first approximation, the agent A consists of a model of the world M with
a set of decision variable X act, and a set of parameters θ. The output of this
model is an action a (belonging to a binary set, A = (A1, A2)).
H then is trusting A as accuracy of representation and this is not a higher
epistemic competency, in the line of Sosa’s suggestion. A simply tries to replicate
the state w of the world. The observation o at any moment will affects the
decision variables X act which will create action a.
In this simple approach, there is no metacognitive requirement on trust. The
trust of H is defined as a conditional probability that A, as a model-building
process, will represent accurately the world. We can simply define trust as a
degree of belief that H has about the accuracy of A’s representation of W:
3See most of the literature on “confidence” and “accuracy” in perception: (Meyniel et al.,
2015; Fleming and Daw, 2017)
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[1] Accuracy-Trust: H ’s trust in A is rational when the probability that A’s
representation of the world a is ‘accurate enough’—to a certain threshold
T acc: tacc = P (a = w, a,M, θ,Xact) ≥ Tacc
We want to augment this cognitive requirement of trust with a metacognitive
one. One key concept in metacognition is ‘confidence.’ As Fleming and Dew
and others suggest, we have some evidence that in the human brain there is a
second process of inference that builds another output, call it the confidence.
(Meyniel et al., 2015; Fleming and Daw, 2017) In the line of the computational
theory of the mind, we can consider ‘confidence’ as a computational process
that happens in the brain, but has its own internal variable, call it Xconf . We
expect a covariance between the internal variables Xact and Xconf . Fleming
and Daw simulated this by a bivariate Gaussian distribution:[
Xact
Xconf
]
= N (w,Σ) ; Σ =
(
σ2act ρσconfσact
ρσconfσact σ
2
conf
)
Without entering the technical details, we can assume that the confidence com-
putational process is coupled, up to a certain coupling constant ρ , to the pro-
cess that decides the action variable a. This second process outputs a parameter
representing its own performance. In the framework adopted here, confidence
and uncertainty are quantified as degrees of beliefs, and are both interpreted
as Bayesian probabilities. (Meyniel et al., 2015) Natural neural networks can
output such confidence probabilities. In its very metacognitive approach, con-
fidence and uncertainty can be ‘statistical summaries’ of the decision-making
process happening in a human brain or in an artificial neural network. (Meyniel
et al., 2015)
The confidence is then represented as a conditional probability of obtaining
the right inference a=w, given both the action model and the confidence model,
a second order model)
tconf = P
(
a = w|a,M, θ,
[
Xact
Xconf
])
We then propose a metacognitive definition of trust. H trusts agent A when
the confidence output improves the degrees of belief of H compared to mere
accuracy:
[2] Confidence-Trust: H’s trust in A is rational when A’s confidence level
improves the accuracy of its representation of the world (and its actions):
tacc ≤ tconf or:
P (a = w, a,M, θ,Xact) ≤ P
(
a = w|a,M, θ,
[
Xact
Xconf
])
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5 Trust in autonomous artificial agents (AAA):
requirements for model and data uncertainty
Some artificial agents based on Machine Learning algorithms and natural neural
networks can implement confidence level mechanisms. But most neural networks
are prone to overfitting. We can suspect here, without offering a full argument,
that data uncertainty and model uncertainty can be on pair with metacognitive
requirements discussed for human agents A. It is a possible start to impose some
metacognitive requirements (in nature) on algorithms such that H is rational.
Model uncertainty is a very general term that refers to the ability of an
algorithm to correct itself. Data uncertainty refers to its ability to select re-
liable data and discard data that is erroneous or noisy. Together with most
of the literature on machine learning, we acknowledge that ‘model uncertainty’
and ‘data uncertainty’ are not present in standard, feed-forward neural net-
work (Murphy, 2012; Kendall and Gal, 2017) Even the infamous Deep Neural
Network approach does not instantiate, as far as it is usually interpreted, the
metacognitive requirement per se. Even those networks which avoid overfitting
and implement partially a data uncertainty, do not fare well in respect of model
uncertainty. We need to model within ML networks their own limitations, such
that they are more ‘rational’ in making decisions. When a rational agent has
low confidence level in its own output, let us say in a classification problem,
it needs to output a result of the form “unable to classify.” In more technical
terms, we need to take the predictive variance of a model more serious when we
evaluate its output. This is a way to show that although data may be reliable
and trustful, the model is not able to represent it as an output.
A new approach to neural network proposed recently suggests that a “confi-
dence readout” can be associated to the dropout method of avoiding overfitting
of neural networks. (MacKay, 2003; Srivastava et al., 2014; Gal and Ghahra-
mani, 2016) Similarly, if one adopts the dual route model suggested before, one
can identify brain-scale circuits and neural codes for uncertainty in the brain.
(Meyniel et al., 2015) When we start with a random or very unlikely a priori
model of the world, the dropout factor gives us an indicator of the correction
path taken to improve the model. The confidence level of this type of AAA
agent is then a combination of a data uncertainty and model uncertainty. In this
case, we can be optimistic that processes happening in the brain that generate
confidence level or statistic summaries can be implements and programmed in
artificial neural networks. Overall, an agent with metacognitive abilities is able
to monitor the decision-making process and becomes more trustworthy than an
agent that lacks some processes. The metacognition literature emphasizes that
this self-monitoring process improves accuracy and the overall predictive per-
formance of the agent. There is nevertheless something more than performance
when it comes to metacognition: for low level of confidence, the agent may not
produce a prediction at all and would suspend its own judgment Confidence
and error-correction are different processes in the mind, but are they different
than the process of decision making? Fleming and Dew model confidence as a
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second-order computation, running in parallel with the decision-making process.
[3] Artificial-Trust (A-trust): H’s trust in an artificial autonomous agent
(AAA) is rational when AAA implements (by design) a certain number of
high-level mechanisms such as: model uncertainty, data uncertainty, and
mechanisms to avoid overfitting.
We can envisage here a future research project in the metacognitive definition
of trust by adding a requirement on AAA which is ethical in nature. Decision
theory has been developed mostly for human, rational agents. Whether it can
be adapted to accommodate artificial intelligence is one of the paths explored
in the philosophical literature on decision theory. We are interested in a more
general foundational issue: integrate ethics in decision theory (Colyvan et al.,
2010), with a special emphasis on artificial agents. The A-trust requirement
and the need for a metacognitive mechanism in AAA agents can be reframed
in terms of multi-objective agents. One possible multi-objective algorithm is
the one in which a third mechanism, with its internal variable X eth calculates a
level of moral confidence in the action of the agent. In the line of an ‘is-ought’
division of judgments, one can take the internal decision variablesX eth andX act
as not being correlated, unlike the correlation between X conf and X act. Multi-
objective agents are discussed frequently in the literature. (Doumpos, 2013)
The multi-objective agent takes all the variables and optimizes two functions,
called here the factual action determined by X act and the normative action with
another output (independent of both a and confidence). H then would trust
agent AAA when the accuracy of its action is “better” morally and factually
than the accuracy without these high-level mechanisms:
[4] Moral-Confidence-Trust: H’s trust in AAA is rational when AAA’s con-
fidence level and the normative assessment improve the accuracy of its
action in the world:
P (a = w, a,M, θ,Xact) ≤ P
(
a = w|a,M, θ,Xeth,
[
Xact
Xconf
])
6 Conclusion
Trust can be framed, in the approach presented here, as a set of metacognitive
requirements. In its simplest form, we suggest that confidence level improves
trust when the conditionalized probability with confidence is greater than the
probability due to accuracy. We find important analogies between the way
confidence is processed in the natural neural networks and artificial networks.
This suggests that a metacognitive requirement on trust can be imposed on
artificial agents.
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